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Re´sume´
Cette note caracte´rise l’assiette optimale d’un impoˆt indirect lorsque la
taxation d’une cate´gorie de biens implique un couˆt fixe d’administration.
Nous montrons que, lorsque les taux d’imposition sont petits, l’assiette op-
timale comprend les biens dont l’indice de de´couragement est supe´rieur au
rapport entre le couˆt d’administration implique´ par leur inte´gration dans
l’assiette et l’impoˆt qu’ils permettent de collecter.
abstract
This note characterizes the optimal base for commodity taxation in the
presence of administrative fixed costs varying across goods. For low tax rates,
the optimal base comprises all commodities whose discouragement index is
greater than the ratio of their administrative costs to the tax they yield.
JEL classification numbers: H21.
Mots-cle´s : Taxation indirecte, TVA, assiette fiscale, couˆts de gestion et
d’administration.
Keywords: indirect taxation, VAT, tax base, administrative costs.
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1 Introduction
The theory of optimal taxation focuses on the excess burden of taxation as
the main source of the social loss caused by taxation. The empirical evidence
however suggests that the administrative costs required to collect taxes may
be substantial (Slemrod, 1990). Most measures of such costs are based on
staff salary or equipment costs, but little is known about their true underlying
determinants and precise shape (Shaw, Slemrod and Whiting, 2010). Polin-
sky and Shavell (1982), Kaplow (1990) and Mayshar (1991) derived optimal
tax rules when the administrative cost function displays usual continuity and
convexity properties with respect to the level of tax rates. Still, as argued by
Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1995) and Alm (1996), it is likely that this function
exhibits significant discontinuities and/or nonconvexities.
Yitzhaki (1979) and Wilson (1989) have given early insights into the opti-
mal indirect tax structure when these discontinuities are due to idiosyncratic
fixed costs. Such a formulation obtains when a minimum number of employ-
ees is required for performing the administration of taxed goods. Otherwise,
no tax is recovered because of, e.g., tax evasion and black market operations.
In this circumstance the characterization of the tax base involves a discrete
choice between taxation and exemption. As first shown by Yitzhaki (1979) in
a simple Cobb-Douglas partial equilibrium economy with one representative
consumer and uniform commodity taxation, this choice not only relies on the
sensitivity of demand to price but also on the level of demand. The tax base
actually comprises all the goods with a low enough ratio of administrative
cost to the amount of tax they yield. Hereafter this ratio will be referred to
as the ‘Yitzhaki ratio.’
This note provides a generalization of Yitzhaki (1979) and Wilson (1989)
by allowing for nonuniform optimal tax rates, and heterogeneous households
with equity considerations. It gives a general rule for including a good in
the tax base. In the case of low tax rates, a good is included in the tax base
only if its associated Mirrlees’ (1976) discouragement index is higher than its
Yitzhaki ratio. There is therefore no specific effect of the equity concerns on
the decision to tax. The influence of equity only transits through the optimal
tax rates: a good whose demand should not be strongly discouraged, possibly
because it is consumed by agents whose social value is high, is less likely to
be taxed.
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2 The setup
There is a continuum of categories of commodities i ∈ C and a continuum
of households h ∈ H. The preferences of household h are represented by a
utility function which is separable across consumption goods and labor,∫
C
uhi (x
h
i )dµi − `h.
The cdf µ captures the relative importance of the different categories of
goods. The problem of household h consists in choosing a bundle (xhi ) and a
labor supply `h which maximize her utility subject to the budget constraint∫
C
(1 + ti)x
h
i dµi ≤ `h.
The demand function solution to this problem is xhi = ξ
h
i (ti) for every i ∈ C.
Indirect utility is∫
C
(
uhi (ξ
h
i (ti))− (1 + ti)ξhi (ti)
)
dµi ≡
∫
C
vhi (ti)dµi.
The contribution of category i goods to the welfare of household h can there-
fore be measured by vhi (ti).
3 The decision to tax
Following Yitzhaki (1979), the tax authority is assumed to pay a fixed cost ci
when it decides to tax (or subsidize) commodity i. Otherwise, this commod-
ity remains tax-free, possibly in the informal sector. Whether a commodity
should be taxed or exempted is a discrete decision to which the standard
Lagrangian method does not directly apply. It can nevertheless be treated
as a continuous decision by proceeding as if it were possible to tax a part pii
of commodity i and to exempt the remaining part of this commodity. The
economically relevant solutions are such that pii is either 0 or 1.
With this new set of variables, the problem of the tax authority is to select
ti and pii for every i ∈ C. Let the distribution of households be represented by
4
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the cdf ν, and let γh stand for the social valuation of the welfare of household
h. At the optimum, the profile ((ti), (pii)) maximizes
∫
H
γh
∫
C
piiv
h
i (ti)dµi +
∫
C
(1− pii)vhi (0)dµi
 dνh (1)
subject to the budget constraint
∫
C
pii
ti ∫
H
ξhi (ti) dν
h − ci
 dµi ≥ R (λ) (2)
and for every i ∈ C,
pii ≥ 0, (ρi)
pii ≤ 1. (σi)
The variables in brackets are the associated Lagrange multipliers associated
to goods of category i. The Lagrangian approach can now be used to give a
necessary condition for commodity i to be taxed. The first-order condition
for pii to be a maximum is∫
H
(
γh
(
vhi (ti)− vhi (0)
)
+ λ
(
tiξ
h
i (ti)− ci
)
+ ρi − σi
)
dµidν
h = 0. (3)
In addition the Kuhn and Tucker exclusion conditions must be satisfied,
ρi ≥ 0, ρipii = 0, (4)
σi ≥ 0, σi(1− pii) = 0. (5)
Let
Li(ti, λ) ≡
∫
H
γhvhi (ti)dν
h + λti
∫
H
ξhi (ti)dν
h
stand for the contribution of commodity i to social welfare (net of its asso-
ciated administrative costs). The following result directly follows from the
first-order condition (3).
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Proposition 1. Assume that commodity i is taxed (or subsidized) at rate ti
when it belongs to the tax base. It should be included in the tax base only if
Li(ti, λ)− Li(0, λ) > λci, or, equivalently,∫
H
βh
(
vhi (ti)− vhi (0)
)
dνh + ti
∫
H
ξhi (ti)dν
h > ci, (6)
where βh ≡ γh/λ is the marginal social valuation of the income of household
h.
Proof. The first-order condition (3) can be rewritten as
Li(ti, λ)− Li(0, λ)− λci + ρi − σi = 0.
If Li(ti, λ) − Li(0, λ) − λci > 0, then ρi ≥ 0 requires σi > 0, and (5) gives
pii = 1. If Li(ti, λ)− Li(0, λ)− λci ≤ 0, then σi ≥ 0 requires ρi > 0, and (4)
shows that commodity i must be exempted (pii = 0). 
Proposition 1 characterizes the optimal tax base associated with arbitrary
tax rates. The optimal tax rate t∗i on commodity i maximizes Li(ti, λ), given
the marginal social cost of public funds λ. It therefore satisfies the first-order
condition
−d∗i ≡
∫
H
t∗i
ξi(t∗i )
∂ξhi
∂ti
(t∗i )dν
h = − ((1− β)− βφ∗i ) , (7)
with
β ≡
∫
H
βhdνh, ξi(t
∗
i ) ≡
∫
H
ξhi (t
∗
i )dν
h, φ∗i ≡ cov
(
βh
β
,
ξhi (t
∗
i )
ξi(t∗i )
)
.
This is the familiar many-person Ramsey formula. At the optimum, the
compensated demand for commodity i must be reduced in proportion to the
Mirrlees’ (1976) discouragement index, d∗i .
In an optimal indirect tax structure, the tax base comprises goods satis-
fying (6), the tax rates (t∗i ) satisfy (7) and the marginal social cost of public
funds λ is determined by the budget constraint (2) of the tax authority.
In order to illustrate how the composition of the tax base given by in-
equality (6) and the Ramsey rule (7) interact, let us consider the empirically
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plausible configuration of low rates of tax, i.e., ti is close enough to 0 for
all i ∈ C. Then, appealing to Roy’s identity, a first-order Taylor expansion
yields
Li(ti, λ) ' Li(0, λ)− ti
∫
H
γhξhi (0)dν
h − λ
∫
H
ξhi (0)dν
h
 .
Thus, by Lemma 1, commodity i should be taxed (or subsidized) at some
rate ti only if
−ti
∫
H
βh
ξhi (0)
ξi(0)
dνh − 1
 > ci
ξi(0)
.
Note that ∫
H
βh
ξhi (0)
ξi(0)
dνh = β
(
1 + cov
(
βh
β
,
ξhi (0)
ξi(0)
))
' β (1 + φ∗i ) ,
where the last approximation is obtained by appealing to the assumption of
a low tax rate. The rule (7) then yields the following result:
Proposition 2. Assume that commodity i is taxed at a low Ramsey tax rate
t∗i when it belongs to the tax base. It should be included in the tax base only
if its associated discouragement index is greater than its Yitzhaki ratio, i.e.,
|d∗i | >
ci
|t∗i | ξi(0)
.
Otherwise it should be exempted.
Proposition 2 gives a clear picture of the optimal tax base. Assume for
instance that the Ramsey tax rate t∗i is positive. Then, commodity i is more
likely to be exempted whenever (1) it is costly to administrate (ci is high),
(2) it yields a low amount of taxes (t∗i ξi(0) is low), and (3) its demand should
not be strongly discouraged (d∗i > 0 is low), i.e., the efficiency cost induced
by taxation of commodity i is high (β is high) and this good is consumed by
households with high social value (φ∗i is positive).
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